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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiffs (the "Grappendorfs") are appealing orders of dismissal pursuant
to Pleasant Grove City's (the "City" or "Pleasant Grove") Motion for Summary Judgment
issued by the district court on March 29, 2005, and May 17, 2005. (Record on Appeal
["R."] at 1034-1056, and 1063-1069). Pursuant to a May 19, 2006 Order, the appeal was
transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). However, at the request of the City of Pleasant Grove ("Pleasant
Grove" or the "City") this Court retained this case pursuant to a June 14, 2006 Order.
Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2.
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APPELLATE ISSUES
A.

Given the Undisputed Facts of this Case as Found Applicable by the Trial Court,
Did the Trial Court Err in Granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's Natural Condition Exception?

B.

Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as Applied to the Grappendorfs, Violate the
Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution?

C.

Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as Applied, Violate the Grappendorfs' Right
under the Utah Constitution to Recover Damages for Injuries Resulting in Death?

D.

Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as Applied, Violate the Grappendorfs'
Petition Rights under the Utah Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pleasant Grove is a municipality in Utah and owns and operates a recreation
venue called "Discovery Park Baseball Diamonds" or "Manila Field." [R. at 1053]. "To
accommodate baseball and softball game play, Pleasant Grove purchased and used a
moveable pitching mound." Id. "This mound had been chained to a fence by a Pleasant
Grove employee, and, in June of 2002 a forceful wind gust [a microburst] lifted the
mound, causing it to strike Daniel A. Grappendorf who sustained fatal injuries." Id.
On September 18, 2003 the Grappendorfs engaged in their constitutionally
protected right to petition for redress of their grievances by filing the instant action
against Pleasant Grove among others. Brief of the Appellant at page 6-7. Pleasant Grove
moved for summary judgment from suit based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
(the "Act"), specifically the natural condition exception and the infliction of mental
anguish exception to general waivers of governmental immunity. After standard briefing,
and supplemental briefing, on February 28, 2005 the trial court heard oral argument. On
March 29, 2005 the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting Pleasant Grove's
Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 1034-1056], The trial court held that "under the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act as in effect in 2002, Defendant Pleasant Grove City is
entitled to immunity from suit for negligence in this case because, by operation of U.C.A.
§ 63-30-10(11) [the natural condition exception to waiver of governmental immunity], the
city's immunity from negligence is not waived." [R. at 1045-46].
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Addressing the Grappendorfs' claim that the Act was unconstitutional as
applied to them the trial court held that: "this court cannot find that the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act as amended in 1987 unconstitutionally abrogated a preexisting and constitutionally protected cause of action for negligence against a
municipality or its employee in the operation or maintenance of a public park." [R. at
1036]. "Because there is no finding that the legislature impermissibly abrogated a cause
of action,... the immunity statute must be applied . . . . " Id.
In a Supplemental Memorandum Decision [R. at 1063-1069], the trial court
further held that in regards to the initial Memorandum Decision: "In short, Pleasant
Grove's operation and maintenance of Manila Field is a governmental function within the
meaning of the Act, and the Act specifically waives immunity from suit for the
negligence of Pleasant Grove." [R. at 1067]. Further, the trial court held that "the
statutory language [of the Act] specifically retains immunity for negligence-based claims
for emotional distress." Id. "Therefore, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 et seq., as in effect in 2002, Pleasant Grove is immune from suit by
Plaintiffs' for their claims for emotional distress." Id. at 1065. After settlement or
dismissal removed any remaining defendants from the instant case, the Grappendorfs
brought this appeal.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Pleasant Grove is a city in Utah, which owns and operates a recreational
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city park and ball field complex called "Discovery Park Baseball Diamonds" or "Manila
Field." See Brief of Appellant; [R. 0346, 1053].
2.

To accommodate both baseball and Softball play at the Manila Fields,1

Pleasant Grove purchased and used a moveable pitching mound made of plywood and
covered with artificial turf. Brief of Appellant at page 9.
3.

At the time of the relevant microburst wind event this mound had been

chained to a fence by a Pleasant Grove employee. [R. 1053].
4.

The pitching mound was chained to the fence by circling the chain through

a nylon strap or handle on the pitching mound. [R. at 258-59]. The nylon strap was
connected to the top edge of the pitching mound by four one-inch screws. Brief of
Appellant at page 9.
5.

The sole purpose for chaining the mound to the fence was to "keep

'somebody from being injured while jumping bikes.'" [R. at 1046 (marks omitted)].
6.

On June 21, 2002, thirteen-year-old Daniel Grappendorf went to watch his

sister play softball at Manila Field. Brief of Appellant at page 9.
7.

At approximately 7:55 p.m., an unexpected and violent summer microburst

wind gust lifted the mound up and pulled it away from the chain-link fence, breaking the
nylon strap and causing the mound to move through the air. See Brief of Appellant at
page 9; [R. at 239, 242, 257, 512 (Appellants' counsel's admission that gust of wind was

1

Softball is played without an elevated pitching mound.
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amicroburst)].
8.

Propelled by the microburst gust of wind, the pitching mound struck and

killed Daniel Grappendorf. Brief of Appellant at page 9; [R. at 1053].
9.

The trial court granted Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment,

finding that the microburst gust of wind was the cause of Daniel Grappendorfs death,
thereby finding the undisputed facts of the case to fall within the "natural condition"
exception to the Governmental Immunity Act, and finding that the Act was constitutional
as applied to the Grappendorfs in light of Article I § 11 (Open Courts Clause) and Article
XVI § 5 (Wrongful Death Guarantee) of the Utah Constitution. Brief of Appellant at
page 10.
10.

On February 28, 2005 the trial court heard brief oral argument regarding the

Grappendorfs' claim that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to them because it
violated their rights under Article I § 1, (Petition Clause) of the Utah Constitution. [R. at
1150 pages 13 and 29]. The trial court did not address the issue in the Memorandum
Decision. Brief of Appellant at page 10. However, the trial court stated at oral argument
with regards to the Petition Clause claim: "you can sue everybody" and "[t]haf s why I
come to work everyday." [R. at 1150 pages 13 and 29].
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly applied the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's
"natural condition" exception to waiver of immunity to the undisputed facts of this case.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Blackner v. State, DepL of Tramp,, 48 P.3d 949, 2002
UT 44, that when a plaintiffs injury "arises out o f or in connection with, or results from
a natural condition on publically owned or controlled lands, governmental immunity is
retained with respect to any action to recover for injuries proximately caused by a
government employee's negligence. The "arises out o f language requires only that there
be some causal nexus between the risk of the natural condition and the resulting injury.
M a t ^15.
Here, the risk that the pitching mound at the publically owned and operated
Manila field would become airborne and strike and kill Daniel Grappendorf "arose out
o f the natural condition of the microburst of wind. "But for" the natural condition of the
microburst gust of wind the pitching mound would have absolutely remained on the
ground. Accordingly, the City is immune from suit on these undisputed facts.
This application of the Act does not violate the Open Courts Clause of the
Utah Constitution. Furthermore, there are no other constitutional infirmities with Judge
Taylor's application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, nor its application in this
case. Judge Taylor's application of the Act in this case does not violate the wrongful
death cause of action guarantee of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Governmental
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Immunity Act allows immunity from suit for all government entities for any injury which
results from the exercise of a government function. The Grappendorfs claim that the
definition of government function is overbroad and bars them from the courts, even
though the Grappendorfs have successfully settled this lawsuit as to at least one
defendant. Here, the municipal operation of a non-proprietary baseball/softball complex
and city park is entirely a government function. At no time in the history of Utah law
would the law and its application have been any different to these undisputed facts.
Given Judge Taylor's thorough and correct application of the Act, the Grappendorfs have
suffered no violation of the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.
Finally, Judge Taylor's application of the Act in this case does not violate
the Petition Clause. The Grappendorfs filed this civil case and have petitioned the court
for grievances. This is evidenced by the fact that the Appellants now have this case on
appeal. The right to petition the courts does not amount to the right to an absolute
outcome. The right to petition the courts as guaranteed in the Utah Constitution
guarantees only the absolute right to file a complaint, which the Grappendorfs have done.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Appellate Review,
The appropriate standards of appellate review applicable in this case were

stated precisely by this Court in Blackner v. State, Dept ofTransp., 48 P.3d 949, 2002
UT 44. In Blackner, this Court held that:
Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. When reviewing whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions no deference and
review those conclusions for correctness. Furthermore, a trial court's
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for
correctness.
Id. at ^J 8 (internal marks and citations omitted).
II.

The Appellants' Factual Assertions on Appeal are not Supported by the
Record nor by Competent Evidence.
In the Grappendorfs' Statements of Fact they make a number of factual

assertions which are unsupported by record evidence or admissible evidence.
For example, the Grappendorfs claim that storing the mound on its side was
"contrary to the manufacturer's express, written safety instructions, which required the
pitching mound to be stored flat on the floor or on its side 'flush against a wall.'" Brief of
Appellant at page 9. There is no factual evidence in the record which indicates that
Pleasant Grove stored the mound "contrary to the manufacturer's express, written safety
instructions." In fact, there were no "safety instructions" with the mound. The record
does indicate that the mound had storage instructions to avoid warping of the mound and
-9-

ensuring the portable pitching mound had a longer use time. The only storage
instructions in the record indicate that:
Storage of all mounds is crucial to longer service time. The warranty
becomes void if the product is not stored properly. Do not store any
products on top of the mounds of the mound is lying flat on the ground. If
the mounds are stored on their side, make certain they are set flush against
the wall. Warpage will occur if other products are stacked on top of the
mound and if the mound is not set flush against the wall. Vacuum out the
Astro Turf before putting the mound in storage to add to service time of the
mound.
[R. at 388]. Clearly these storage instructions are not "safety instructions." In fact,
Pleasant Grove was storing the mound on its side as these storage instructions indicate
they should. Whether the mound was flush against a wall or chain link fence is of no
moment here, as the storage instructions only indicate this should be done to avoid
warping of the mound, not as any type of safety precaution.
Also, the Grappendorfs cite to inadmissible evidence which they attached as
an exhibit to their Response in Opposition to Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The trial court indicated these exhibits were improper and did not consider
this evidence. In footnote 25 of the Memorandum Decision the trial court states:
Exhibit 2 is not an affidavit of Paul Schoonover and is replete with
inadmissible hearsay. . . . This exhibit, filed without foundation, may not be
considered by this court in any event. U.R.C.P. 12 allows the court to
consider "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits...." This and the Plaintiffs similar
exhibits appear to be transcripts of telephone conversations and are not any
of those items listed in Rule 12.
[R. at 1046]. The Appellants' Brief repeatedly cites to the inadmissible evidence which
-10-

the trial court did not use, as it is not allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Brief of Appellants at page 9, f 3 (citing to Exhibit 2, Paul Schoonover Memo), and ^ 4
(citing to Detective Thornton Memo). This Court cannot consider these inadmissible
documents.2
The Grappendorfs now cite to these exhibits, and other non-existent facts,
as if they are properly in the record. See e.g., Brief of Appellant at page 9, ^ 3 (safety
instructions), f 4 (not to secure the pitching mound to a fence), and ^f 8 (decapitated).
References to facts which do not exist in the record, or are improperly in the record,
should not be considered by this Court.
III.

Judge Taylor Correctly Applied the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's
Natural Condition Exception to the Undisputed Facts of this Case.
"[T]o determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under

the Act, we apply a three-part test, which assesses (1) whether the activity undertaken is a
governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular
activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at f
10.

2

Although these facts are unsupportable, even if they were record evidence and
were considered by this Court to constitute negligent storage, it would not matter as the
trial court correctly found at footnote 4 of the Memorandum Decision, under the express
exceptions to waivers of governmental immunity that are applicable to this case, "the
court may assume that Pleasant Grove was negligent." [R. at 1053].
-11-

A,

Government Function.
The Act defines a 'governmental function' as:

'Governmental function' means any act, failure to act, operation, function,
or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to
act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental,
proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government,
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government
or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or
private persons.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). Utah Courts have interpreted this definition broadly.
Laney v Fairview City, 2002 UT 79,14, 57 P.3d 1007, 1011 (Utah 2002) (holding that
the term governmental function is broadly defined in section 63-30-2(4)(a), and by virtue
of that broad definition, the statute cloaks governmental entities with immunity for a wide
range of activities.).
While the Grappendorfs now dispute on appeal whether the maintenance of
the Manila Fields by Pleasant Grove is a government function, the trial court properly
stated the Grappendorfs' position in the record when it stated that: "It is undisputed that
Pleasant Grove is a city and that the maintenance and operation of Manila Field is a
'government function'.. .." [R. at 1051]. Further, the Grappendorfs only dispute whether
Pleasant Grove is engaging in a government function under the constitutional analysis
which is addressed below. The Grappendorfs leave any discussion of whether Pleasant
Grove is engaged in a government function out of their analysis of whether the natural
condition exception to a waiver of governmeni immunity applies. This is likely because
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of the sweeping language in the definition of "government function" of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act in effect in 2002 at the time of this tragic accident.3 Further,
in their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the City
affirmatively stated that: "The City owns and operates the Discovery Park Baseball
Diamonds (the "Diamonds") which are sometimes referred to as Manila Field." [R. at
0259], The Grappendorfs did not dispute this fact at all. [R. at 0515 (stating that
"Plaintiffs do not generally disagree with any of Defendants facts[.]")]. Simply, it cannot
be disputed that Pleasant Grove's maintenance of the Manila Fields was anything other
than a government function.
B.

Waiver of Immunity.
The trial court assumed Pleasant Grove was negligent.4 If Pleasant Grove

were negligent in their storage of the pitching mound, immunity from suit would be
waived under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.
C.

Exception to Immunity Waiver.
The Grappendorfs allege on appeal that the trial court erred in determining

3

Effective July 1, 2004, the relevant provision of the Act was reenacted as Utah
Code § 63-30d-301. However, "[i]t is the intent of the legislature that: (1) injuries alleged
to be caused by a governmental entity that occurred before July 1, 2004 be governed by
the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30 . . .". Section 48 of Laws 2004, c. 267. Thus, Title
63, Chapter 30 is cited in this memorandum.
4

Pleasant Grove would submit that the clear and undisputed facts of this case
indicate that they were not negligent in their storage of the pitching mound. However, as
discussed herein, this Court need not decide the negligence issue to dispose of this case
because as the trial court did, even where negligence is assumed, immunity applies.
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that the natural condition exception to the waiver of immunity applied to the undisputed
facts. The Act provides an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity where the
Grappendorfs' alleged injury either "arises out of, in connection with, or results from:...
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands

" Utah Code Ann. §

63-30-10(11); see Blackner, 2002 UT 44, «[j 11. This language evidences the clear intent
of the legislature of the State of Utah.
The Blackner court explained that:
When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first
looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language
unless the language is ambiguous. The statute's language plainly states that
all governmental entities are immune from suit for a government
employee's negligence when the plaintiffs injury arose from, was
connected with, or resulted from a "natural condition on publicly owned or
controlled lands." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) (1997).
Id. at ^| 12 (citations omitted).5
5

A thorough recitation of this Court's review of the Utah Government Immunity
Act's exceptions to waiver of government immunity is provided in Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d
616, 622, 2000 UT 19 \ 17, where this Court slates:
In construing these subsections, we apply long-standing rules of statutory
construction. This court's primary objective in construing enactments is to
give effect to the legislature's intent. The plain language of a statute is
generally the best indication of that intent. Therefore, where the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's
plain meaning to divine legislative intent. The plain language of a statute is
to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and
related chapters. Furthermore, where possible we construe statutory
provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms. Most pertinent here is
the rule that a statute dealing specifically with a particular issue prevails
over a more general statute that arguably also deals with the same issue.
Id. (internal marks, citations, and quotations omitted).
-14-

In Blackner, Mr. Blackner was on his way up Little Cottonwood Canyon
when he was stopped in a known avalanche area because crews were removing snow off
the road from a prior avalanche. Id. at ^J 4. While Mr. Blackner was stopped in the
known avalanche area, another avalanche came down the mountain and injured Mr.
Blackner. Id. at \ 6. Mr. Blackner sued the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT)
and Alta City, alleging that their negligence in managing the first avalanche and stopping
him in a known avalanche area resulted in his injuries. Id. at % 7. The only issue decided
by the Utah Supreme Court in Blackner was whether the "natural condition" exception
shielded UDOT and Alta City from liability for the alleged negligent acts or omissions of
governmental employees. Id. at ^f 10.
Similar to Blackner, the Grappendorfs claim on appeal that it was the
negligence of Pleasant Grove that was the proximate cause of their injuries and the death
of Daniel Grappendorf. For example, the Grappendorfs claim that "but for" the
negligence of Pleasant Grove the microburst wind gust "would not have caused the
pitching mound to become airborne nor would the pitching mound have caused Daniel
Grappendorfs death." Brief of Appellant at page 13. The Grappendorfs also claim that
"the governmental negligence

disregarding express manufacturer's instructions and

placing an artificial pitching mound in a position that was contrary to the safe procedure
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required by the manufacturer

created the danger."6 Id. Mr. Blackner made the same

argument when he claimed that "the negligence of UDOT and Alta was the proximate
cause of his injuries instead of that avalanche." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at \ 13. Just like
this Court said in Blackner, here the Grappendorfs' argument "either miscomprehends or
misapplies the plain language of the Act." Id.
As the Blackner court explained, Mr. Blackner misunderstood the plain
language of the Act, and here so have the Grappendorfs, because:
The Act unequivocally provides that when a plaintiffs injury either arises
out of or in connection with, or results from a natural condition on publicly
owned or controlled lands, governmental immunity is retained with respect
to any action to recover for injuries proximately caused by a government
employee's negligence. The application of the "natural condition"
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity does not hinge on
whether the "natural condition" in any way "proximately caused" the
plaintiffs injuries.
In the instant case, even assuming that the actions of Payne and Medara
were negligent and proximately caused Blackner's injuries, UDOT and Alta
are immune from suit to recover for those injuries because Blackner's
injuries arose out of a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled
land.
Id. atffif13-14.
The Blackner court then goes on to explain that:
Under the statute, the "arise out o f language requires only that there be
some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury. In other
words, but for the [natural condition], Blackner would not have suffered

6

As discussed in section I of this Brief, these arguments are simply not supported
by the record. Nowhere in the manufacturer's storage instructions are danger or safety
issues discussed. See [R. at 387-89].
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injury.... Blackner's injuries arose out of a natural condition existing on
publicly owned or controlled land. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
concluded that UDOT and Alta are immune from Blackner's suit because
the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity
applies to Blackner's injuries regardless of whether Payne and Medara [the
government employees] were negligent.
Id. at Xi 15-16. The plain language of the Act is clear, and this Court's strict
interpretation of that plain language is also clearly and unequivocally evidenced in
Blackner.
Blackner is not the only case where the plain language of the Act has been
clearly evidenced. For example in Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996), this Court
held that the plain language of section 63-30-10 immunizes a government entity against a
negligence action when the injury arises out of one of the exceptions listed in section 6330-10. Id. at 502. "The definition section of the Act states that "injury means death,
among other things." Id. (citing § 63-30-2(5)) (marks omitted). "Thus a governmental
entity is immune from a negligence action for a death arising out of an [section 63-30-10
exception to waiver of government immunity]." Id.
Simply, if a natural condition occurs on publically owned land and is a "but
for" cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the governmental entity responsible for that land will
not be liable for any injuries resulting from the natural condition, even if there was
negligence by the government entity which contributed to the accident. Here, it is beyond
reason to suggest, and the Grappendorfs do not so suggest, that "but for" the microburst
gust of wind the injury to Daniel Grappendorf would not have occurred. Even if Pleasant
-17-

Grove had left what the Grappendorfs claim was a 400 pound pitching mound simply half
propped against the fence without any chain at all, only a microburst of wind could get
the pitching mound airborne and lead to the tragic chain of events that did in fact unfold
in this case. In fact, it is quite possible that a microburst of wind could have even picked
the pitching mound up from the ground and caused these same injuries to a person even if
the pitching mound were laying flat on the ground during a baseball game or during
routine storage.7
The Grappendorfs also argue in their Appellant Brief that Blackner does not
apply to this case because "in Blackner the 'natural condition' preceded the governmental
negligence and was the cause of the plaintiffs injury." Brief of Appellant at page 12.
The Grappendorfs claim that because their were two avalanches in Blackner, one that
caused the road blockage and one that hurt Mr. Blackner, the Blackner court must have

7

A microburst of wind is a major natural condition/disaster. The Grappendorfs
attempt to trivialize the gust of wind which picked up the pitching mound. However, this
was a major wind event capable of unknown damage and disastrous consequences. See
[R. at 315, 320]; see e.g., Friends of Gateway v. Slater, 257 F.3d 74, 76 (2nd Cir. 2001)
(a microburst is a small but powerful rush of cold air that spreads out as it reaches the
ground and can cause the wind to shift 180 degrees several times within the space of a
few miles); Fajardo Shopping Center, S.E. v. Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Puerto, 167 F.3d 1
at fn 12 (1st Cir. 1999) (microburst winds can generate damaging horizontal winds of up
to 168 mph); McAleer v. Smith, 860 F.Supp. 924, 941-42 (D. R.L 1994) (a microburst is
an act of God or a natural disaster similar to a localized hurricane which can produce
destructive force and extremely unfortunate results); Caldwell v. Let The Good Times Roll
Festival, 111 So.2d 1263, 1269-72 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (a microburst gust of wind, which
is a possibility with any storm, is not reasonably foreseeable and is an act of God or force
majeure sufficient to relieve the city of liability).
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meant that the first avalanche "and not the government employee - - was the cause of the
plaintiffs injuries." Brief of Appellant at page 12. This argument misses the mark on a
number of levels. First, Blackner was an anomaly where there were two separate natural
conditions, and both avalanches were "but for" causes of Mr. Blackner's harm. "But for"
the first avalanche Mr. Blackner does not stop and is not hurt. "But for" the negligence of
the UDOT employees, Mr. Blackner does not get hurt. Also, "but for" the second
avalanche cascading down the mountain, Mr. Blackner does not get hurt. In Blackner,
and in this case, the facts clearly evidence that the injuries "arose out o f a natural
condition.
It belies logic to accept the Grappendorfs' argument that first a natural
condition must occur, followed by government negligence in order for the natural
condition exception to apply. This is not what the Act says, and it is certainly not what
Blackner stands for. Furthermore, the government's alleged negligence is just simply not
applicable to decisions of governmental immunity under section 63-30- 10fs waiver
exceptions. For example, this Court has held that:
In determining whether an injury falls within this exception to section
63-30- 10's general waiver of immunity for negligence claims, we have
rejected attempts to evade the statutory categories by recharacterizing the
supposed cause of the injury. Instead, we have focused on the conduct or
situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted
by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.
Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502 (citing cases) (marks omitted); see Taylor on Behalf of Taylor v.
Ogden City School DisL, 927 P.2d 159, (Utah 1996) (holding that conduct of government
-19-

employees should "play[] no part in the court's analysis or conclusions t h a t . . . the
governmental entity was immune from suit.").
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs present two hypothetical arguments (labeled
"simple examples") regarding the natural conditions of gravity and predictable wind
conditions. These arguments are also off the mark. First, the Grappendorfs claim that if a
Pleasant Grove employee secured the pitching mound above the full bleachers at a
baseball game with kite string, and the mound naturally broke the string and fell because
of the natural condition of gravity,8 injuring the spectators, that Pleasant Grove would be
immune from suit. If this odd scenario were to ever unfold, the employee who placed a
pitching mound above a spectator seating area would be guilty of malice or malicious
conduct. In 2002 the Utah Government Immunity Act specifically stated that where an
employee acted with malice they could be personally liable. See Utah Code Ann. 63-304(4)(a) (2003). This just was not the case here and this "simple example" is wholly

8

In cases like Blackner, Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D. Utah 1999)
(holding that the dangerous condition that resulted in the death of plaintiff was the
naturally occurring sandstone cliffs, rather than the act of planning a party in their
vicinity), and this case, the natural conditions are not the types of natural conditions from
which a government entity could affirmatively protect the public. If government entities
were forced to engage in protecting the public from natural conditions like avalanches,
sandstone cliffs, and microburst winds it would result in enormous monetary and social
cost. When possible, government entities do all they can to protect the public from these
severe natural conditions. However, the Utah Legislature has recognized that tragic
circumstances like those in Blackner, Apffel, and this case can happen as a result of
severe, unpredictable, unexpected, and sometimes unmanageable natural condilions and
thus, government entities like the City are immune from liability arising from these types
of natural conditions under the Act.
-20-

misplaced.
The Grappendorfs second "simple example" involves negligent renovation
of a state capital building and misses the mark completely. The natural condition
exception would not apply at all in that "simple example," because the Act as written in
2002 specifically states that there is an exception to the waiver of immunity for "a latent
dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure,... or other
public improvement." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(17) (2003).
Simply put, the legislature has determined that certain situations and
occurrences allow for immunity from suit for government entities even if the alleged
injuries is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of a government employee.
A natural condition is absolutely one of these situations.9 The microburst wind gust on
June 21, 2002 was a natural condition which was severe enough to pick up, rip from a
chain, and move what the Grappendorfs claim is an approximately 400 pound pitching
mound. "But for" the unpredictably severe and unfortunately tragic microburst wind gust
on June 21, 2002, the Grappendorfs would not have suffered the injury complained of in

9

The Grappendorfs also brought claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress against the City. However, the Act states that: "Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury
arises out of, in connection with, or results from .. . (2). .. infliction of mental anguish ..
.". Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2)(1997). Accordingly, the City is immune from
Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Act.
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs did not raise these issues in the Brief of Appellant and
thus have effectively abandoned these claims on appeal.
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this lawsuit. The Grappendorfs' alleged injuries and the tragic death of Daniel
Grappendorf absolutely and unequivocally arose from a natural condition. Thus, the City
is immune from this lawsuit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Accordingly, Judge Taylor was correct in granting Pleasant Grove summary
judgment pursuant to the natural condition exception to the waiver of government
immunity in light of the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) and the Utah
Supreme Court's interpretation of the natural condition exception in Blackner v. State,
Dept. ofTransp., 48 P.3d 949, 2002 UT 44.
IV.

As Applied in this Case the Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not
Violate the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.
The Grappendorfs did not make any constitutional arguments in their

Response in Opposition to Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment.10 See

10

Because the Grappendorfs presented completely new legal theories in their
supplemental briefing, it was error for the trial court to consider it and this Court should
not consider the Grappendorfs' Constitutional arguments on de novo review. See [R. at
1054 (stating that the Supplemental Memorandum "goes far beyond correcting any
characterization of the law that Pleasant Grove has put forward.")]. As this Court has
stated:
While Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. provides that leave to amend 'shall be freely
given when justice so requires,' the liberality of the rule is not without limit,
particularly when nothing new or of substance is contained in the proposed
amendment. The permitting of amendments to pleadings rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and we find no abuse of that discretion in this
case. Furthermore, an unverified amendment of a pleading should not be
allowed to defeat a motion for summary judgment if the amendment does
not effect any substantial change in the issues as they were originally
formulated in the pleadings.
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960).
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[R. at 497-518 generally]. Rather, the Grappendorfs waited some two months until the
eve of the Motion for Summary Judgment hearing before they filed a Motion to Amend
their Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary
Judgment. See [R. at 881-892]. The trial court granted the Grappendorfs' Motion to
Amend and treated their pleading, together with the City's Motion to Strike, as
supplemental briefing.
The Grappendorfs present two arguments as to why the district court's
decision violates the Open Courts Clause. First, the Grappendorfs argue that the district
court "interprets Blackner in a manner that contravenes the Open Courts Clause." Brief
of Appellant at 16. For the reasons argued in the above section, and those argued in this
section, this argument is unavailing.11 Contrary to the Grappendorfs claim, the district
court did not "misuse" Blackner in contravention of the Open Courts Clause, and did not
expand under any circumstances the application of the natural condition exception. It is
undisputed that the injury to the Grappendorfs arose out of a natural condition.
This Court has stated that, "[although the open courts clause protects both
substantive and procedural rights, the clause is not an absolute guarantee of all
substantive rights." Tindley v. Salt Lake City School DisL, 116 P.3d 295, 2005 UT 30 at f
17. The Open Courts Clause "applies only to legislation which "abrogates a cause of

ll

The Grappendorfs settled this lawsuit as to one defendant. That is prima facie
evidence that the Grappendorfs have not been precluded a remedy in this case in Open
Court.
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action existing at the time of its enactment." Id. (citation omitted). "The legislature thus
remains free to abrogate or limit claims that could not have been brought under
then-existing law. Claims barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity are an
example of this principle." Id.
The Grappendorfs do not argue that at some point in time prior to 2002 they
could have brought a claim under these facts which has now been abrogated by the
district courts application of Blackner. Rather, the Grappendorfs rely on their flawed
logic that because in their eyes Blackner abrogates all claims against government entities
the application thereof violates the Open Courts Clause. This is not the case. For
example, if Daniel Grappendorf had climbed under the mound, and it fell on him without
aid of any natural condition, breaking the strap and killing him, contrary to what the
Grappendorfs claim, the natural condition exception would not apply simply because
gravity had made the mound fall. This is because it is common sense that a municipality
must undertake protecting the public from common concerns and occurrences associated
with gravity. See e.g., Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568,
573 (Utah 1996) (holding that "once an entity undertakes to provide that protection, it is
obligated to use reasonable care in providing it.").
Here, the City had not undertaken to provide protection from microburst
gusts of wind. See [R. at 1046 (purpose of chaining mound was to protect from jumping
bikes)]. As is discussed above, a microburst gust of wind can take objects properly
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secured to avoid the forces of gravity and turn them into lethal projectiles. Accordingly,
as is thoroughly discussed above, the proximate cause from which this accident "arose out
o f was the sudden, forceful, and unexpected microburst of wind. Thus, the district court
correctly applied Blackner and did not abrogate the Grappendorfs of any claim.
Second, the Grappendorfs claim that the definition of "government
function" in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a), that was adopted by the Utah Legislature in
1987 is unconstitutionally overbroad and thus abrogates their right to the Open Courts.
The Grappendorfs argue that this Court should apply the Berry test found in Berry By and
Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) as that test was
confirmed in Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002).
This argument places the proverbial cart before the horse. In order for the
Berry test to apply, the Grappendorfs must prove they were in fact abrogated of a preexisting claim for wrongful death against the City. They cannot do so, and thus the Berry
test is inapplicable. The district court recognized this, when stating "[bjecause there is no
finding that the legislature impermissibly abrogated a cause of action, this court will not
apply the Berry test as directed in Laney; the immunity statute must be applied as
presently in effect." [R. at 1036].
Claiming they were in fact abrogated of their Open Courts Clause rights,
the Grappendorfs now believe that the City's operation of the Manila fields is proprietary,
and thus was not a government function entitled to immunity. Prior to 1987 proprietary
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functions were not considered government functions. See Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) (holding that proprietary operation of a public golf
course was not a "governmental function" within purview of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act). This would mean the Grappendorfs would have had a claim against a
proprietary function prior to 1987. However, after 1987 proprietary functions are
immune from suit. None of this matters however, as the operation of the Manila Fields is
not proprietary and would never had fit within the Standiford proprietary context.
Notwithstanding, the Grappendorfs argue, absent any factual support or
citation, that the operation of baseball park facility like Manila Field is proprietary like
the golf course was in Standiford. The Grappendorfs apparently misunderstand that a
golf course charges those who use it and the Manila Field complex does not. The Manila
Field complex is not proprietary, and there is nothing in the record that indicates
otherwise. The Grappendorfs visited the Manila Fields without paying for admission.
They did not pay to park. It is undisputed that the Manila Fields are absolutely a nonproprietary public park or public recreational facility. See [R. at 0196 (Grappendorfs
Second Complaint asserting that City Parks and Recreation employees cared for the
mound); R. at 514 (Grappendorfs stating mound was "delivered directly to the Pleasant
Grove City Parks Department.")]. Ironically, in Standiford this Court held that:
The most general test of governmental function relates to the nature of the
activity. It must be something done or furnished for the general public good,
that is, of a "public or governmental character", such as the maintenance
and operation of public schools, hospitals, public dimities, public parks or
recreational facilities.
-26-

Id. at 1231 (emphasis added); see Husband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 P.2d 491,
494 (Utah 1937) (holding that "in the establishment, maintenance, and care of its parks, a
city acts in its governmental capacity and is not liable for the negligence of its employees
or agents in connection therewith."); see also [R. at 1038].
The operation of the Manila Field is clearly not proprietary. Thus, under no
circumstances have the Grappendorfs been abrogated of some right to bring a wrongful
death claim against the City. Accordingly, this Court need not address the Grappendorfs'
arguments as they pertain to applying the Berry test as it was applied in Laney v. Fairview
City, 57 P.3d 1007, 2002 UT 79.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Laney decision would even apply to this
case. For example, Laney holds that given an 1987 amendment to the Act, government
entities are in fact immune for the negligent acts of all government functions that fit into
one of the recognized exceptions found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. Laney, 2002 UT
79 at *f 26 (holding "the Act immunizes the City from suit for the negligence alleged by
plaintiffs."). The Laney Court's majority then goes on hold the following:
We therefore hold that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional as it applies
to municipalities operating electrical power systems. .. . where a high duty
of care is imposed. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the
amendment as applied to other municipal activities since a lower standard
of care may apply and different considerations may be relevant.
Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79 at ^| 71 (emphasis added). Time and time again
throughout the main opinion of Laney, the concurrence, and the dissent, the holding of

-27-

Laney is specifically limited to only the operation of a municipal power system.12
In talking about the objective of the Utah Legislature in allowing personal
injury claims and wrongful death claims against municipalities to expressly be abrogated
under the Act, the main Court opinion in Laney states "[w]hile that objective is worthy,
the legislature swept to broadly when it severely curtailed negligence actions against
municipalities operating power systems." Id. at \ 66. Furthermore, in his concurrence,
Justice Russon notes that "[t]he operation of a power plant by a government entity is
proprietary.... I concur that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional as it applies
municipalities operating electrical power systems . . . " Id. at f 81-83.
For four reasons the district court doubted that Laney would apply to this
case. First, the district court felt that Laney was expressly limited to "municipalities
operating electrical power systems[.]" [R. at 1043]. Second, Laney's lead opinion was
only a plurality analysis. Third, "the immunity sought to be retained in Laney was urged
based on an exception to immunity quite different from the one presently before the court,
and it is not clear how this court must proceed when, as here, 'a lower standard of care

12

In a 14 page concurrence and dissent by Justice Wilkins, joined by Justice
Durrant, they state that they would uphold the main opinion's first holding that Fairview
City is immune from liability. Id. at ^[84. However, these Justices expressly disagree with
the main opinion and the concurrence in holding that any part, however limited, of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) is unconstitutional. Id. at % 86 (stating "1 would therefore
affirm the district court's ruling that Fairview City is immune from suit for the alleged
negligence."). All of this language shows what a broad misinterpretation of the holding
and language of Laney plaintiffs present to this Court.
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may apply and different considerations may be relevant.'" [R. at 1042]. Fourth,
"decisions subsequent to Laney may indicate that the court does not intend Laney to have
the sweeping effect Plaintiffs ask for here." [R. at 1041].
It is clear that extension of the scope of Laney beyond the operation of
municipal power plant should never extend to something that was not proprietary in
nature like the operation and maintenance of a public park and baseball diamond.
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs have presented no factual evidence in the record which
indicates that the operation of Manila field was proprietary. For this reason, and those
stated above, the Grappendorfs cannot prove that they were in fact abrogated of a preexisting claim for wrongful death against the City in violation of the Open Courts Clause.
V.

The District Court's Application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in
this Case Does Not Violate the Wrongful Death Cause of Action Guarantee of
the Utah Constitution.
Initially, the Grappendorfs did not properly and fully present this argument

at the trial court. Notwithstanding, Judge Taylor indicated that Article XVI § 5 "is part of
the article on 'Labor.'" [R. at 1045 (footnote 26 of the Memorandum Decision)]. The
trial court also noted that "[n]o party has cited any cases demonstrating that this section
applies in the present action. As such, this decision addresses only Article I § 11." Id.
The Grappendorfs made no constitutional arguments at all in their Response in
Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment. See [R.
at 497-518 generally]. The Grappendorfs do briefly address Article XVI § 5 in their
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Supplemental Memorandum. See [R. at 881-892]. In their Brief of Appellant, the
Grappendorfs do present a lengthy discussion of the history of Utah law and wrongful
death claims. The Grappendorfs fail to recognize that here, their wrongful death claim is
against a government entity. Thus, case law or statutory law which does not fall within
this exact same framework is unpersuasive. Despite their historical analysis, the
Grappendorfs cite no Utah statute indicating how Article XVI § 5 specifically applies to
wrongful death claims against government entities.13
Essentially, the Grappendorfs argue only that similar to their unpersuasive
arguments made regarding the Open Courts Clause, their claims against Pleasant Grove
has been abrogated by the application of the Utah Government Immunity Act. However,
this Court has expressly held that this argument is unpersuasive. Tiede v. State of Utah,
915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996).
In Tiede, two felons walked away from a state halfway house, holed up for
a week in a cabin, and then made a call to another inmate and informed they would kill
the cabin's owners when they arrived. Id. at 501. The inmate the felons called told state
officials about this call but the state failed to respond to the information. Id. As

13

The Grappendorfs claim that a statute did create a cause of action for wrongful
death prior to the enactment of the Utah Constitution. Brief of Appellant at page 20.
However, that statute expressly limits those who may be liable to a person, a company, or
a corporation. Id. This statute does not create a cause of action in wrongful death against
a government entity. See id. The "every such case" language emphasized by the
Grappendorfs is limited to only a liable person, company, or corporation. Id. The statute,
from 1874, has no applicability to this case.
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represented, the two felons killed the cabins homeowners and kidnaped their kids. Id.
The heirs of the deceased and the kids brought a civil action "alleging that the State was
negligent in failing to apprehend [the felons] and in failing to protect their family
members from the inmates. The action further alleges that the State proximately caused
the injuries and the two deaths. The district court dismissed the complaint against the
State on the basis of governmental immunity." Id. at 501-02.
As was discussed previously, in Tiede, this Court analyzed section 63-30-10
exceptions to waivers of immunity and found that the district court correctly determined
that the state was immune from suit. Id. at 502. In analyzing the wrongful death aspects
of the Tiede case, this Court held that:
Wrongful death is a civil claim created by statute. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-11-7. Nevertheless, its express mention in section 63-30-10[] is
unnecessary because, as we have observed, this section already immunizes a
governmental entity if a death arises out of [the conduct or condition listed
in the section 63-30-10 exceptions].
Id. at 503. The plaintiffs in Tiede also claimed that this application of the Act abrogated
their constitutional right under Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution.
In analyzing whether this right was abrogated, the Utah Supreme Court held
that "the scope of protection afforded by the wrongful death provision is limited to rights
of action that existed at the time the provision was adopted." Id. at 504. "Sovereign
immunity was a settled feature of the common law when Utah became a state and adopted
its constitution." Id. "At the time the constitution was adopted in 1895, there was no
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express constitutional or statutory authority allowing suits for wrongful death against the
State." Id. "In sum, by retaining governmental immunity from wrongful death suits
against the State, section 63-30-10[] does not abrogate any previously existing right of
action and therefore does not violate article XVI, section 5." Id. Sovereign immunity and
governmental immunity both apply to the City. The Grappendorfs do not cite one case
that states otherwise. See Brief of Appellant, generally. Nor do they cite one case that
indicates that they had a prior right to assert claim for wrongful death against a
government entity. See id.
The Grappendorfs claim that the Tiede decision was incorrect and that this
Court as currently situated should overrule Tiede. Brief of Appellant at page 19. This
argument is unavailing as Tiede was correctly decided and is very sound law. This
Court's opinion in Tiede has been relied on by this Court since it was decided for the
express holding that immunity exists for a government entity against a claim for wrongful
death, and that this application of the Act does not violate Article XVI § 5 of the Utah
Constitution. See Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 116 P.3d 295, 305, 2005 UT 30
at ^ 36 (recognizing Tiede in holding that the Act does not abrogate any previously
existing right of action and therefore does not violate article XVI, section 5); Parks v.
Utah Transit Authority, 53 P.3d 473, 477, 2002 UT 55 % 15 (citing Tiede for "observing
that when the state constitution was adopted, there was no express constitutional or
statutory authority allowing suits for wrongful death against the State."). It is clear that
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Tiede was correctly decided and that the Grappendorfs have not suffered a violation of
Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution as a result of the trial court's application of the
natural condition exception to the waiver of government immunity to their claim of
wrongful death.
VI.

Judge Taylor's Application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in this
Case Does Not Violate the Petition Clause of the Utah Constitution.
The Grappendorfs argue on appeal that the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act, as applied, violated their Petition rights under the Utah Constitution. See Brief of
Appellant at pages 4, 23-24. Initially, this argument was not made in pleading format to
the trial court. See [R. 0881-0892]. The Grappendorfs did however raise this issue at oral
argument on the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. See [R. 1150 at secondary pages
13 and 29]. Notwithstanding, this argument is misplaced.
As stated in the Appellant's Brief, the Petition Clause of the Utah
Constitution assures that "[a] 11 men have the inherent and inalienable right to . . . petition
for redress of grievances

" Brief of Appellant at page 23 (citing Utah Const. Art. I, §

1). Appellants' Brief admits that a petition is a formal written request to a court, or in
other words, a Complaint. See id. In the Grappendorfs own words the Petition Clause
assures that all citizens of Utah are allowed to file a complaint in the court system. See
id. The Grappendorfs cite to two cases for support, but these cases both indicate that the
filing of a complaint essentially satisfies the Petition Clause. See Kish v. Wright, 562
P.2d 625 (Utah 1977) (holding that "civil rights actions arising under Sec. 1983 of the
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United States Code can be properly brought within the jurisdiction of this state."). In
other words the Kish court only held that a state court must entertain jurisdiction over a
section 1983 civil rights case if such a complaint is filed in state court. Id.
Furthermore, the Grappendorfs admit that in the case of In re Anderson, 82
P.3d 1134, 2004 UT 7 \ 68 (Utah 2004), this Court stated that filing a civil complaint was
tantamount to exercising ones right to petition for the redress of grievances. Here, it is
undisputed that the Grappendorfs were allowed to file their civil complaint. Thus, the
Grappendorfs did petition the trial court to redress their grievances. The trial court
indicated at oral argument that the Grappendorfs had been allowed to petition for their
grievances when it said the Petition Clause guarantees only that: "you can sue everybody"
and "[tjhat's why I come to work everyday." [R. 1150 at pages 13 and 29]. In other
words, filing your complaint and getting your claim properly before the court satisfies the
Petition Clause. The Petition Clause does not guarantee a right to an absolute outcome.
The Grappendorfs have brought their claims against Pleasant Grove and
other defendants who have now been dismissed with prejudice. The district court has
ruled on those claims or they have been settled and those defendants dismissed with
prejudice. See Brief of Appellant at page 6-8. The Petition Clause goes no further than to
say that all persons have the right to petition the court to redress their grievances, which
in this case the Plaintiffs have clearly done. Accordingly, their was no violation of the
Petition Clause in this case under any scenario.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests that this Court
affirm Judge Taylor's grant of governmental immunity to Pleasant Grove in this case.
DATED this

ft?

day of October, 2006.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

PETER STIRBA
MEB W. ANDERSON
Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City
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